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AbstrACt
Objectives The current research project sought to map 
out the regulatory landscape for patient safety in the 
English National Health Service (NHS).
Method We used a systematic desk-based search 
using a variety of sources to identify the total number of 
organisations with regulatory influence in the NHS; we 
researched publicly available documents listing external 
inspection agencies, participated in advisory consultations 
with NHS regulatory compliance teams and reviewed the 
websites of all regulatory agencies.
results Our mapping revealed over 126 organisations 
who exert some regulatory influence on NHS provider 
organisations in addition to 211 Clinical Commissioning 
Groups. The majority of these organisations set standards 
and collect data from provider organisations and a 
considerable number carry out investigations. We found 
a multitude of overlapping functions and activities. The 
variability in approach and overlapping functions suggest 
that there is no overall integrated regulatory approach.
Conclusion Regulation potentially provides a variety of 
benefits in terms of maintaining the safety and quality 
of care by providing an external perspective on the care 
being delivered. However, the variability, extent and 
fragmentation of the regulatory system of the NHS make it 
hard for regulators to act effectively and places a massive 
burden on NHS provider organisations. Overlapping 
regulatory requests may distract locally driven initiatives 
to improve safety and quality. Further research is needed 
to understand the full extent of regulatory activity and the 
true benefits and costs incurred.
IntrOduCtIOn
Regulation is one important means of moni-
toring and improving the safety of healthcare 
with the aim of ensuring safe, reliable treat-
ment for patients and a safe working environ-
ment for healthcare professionals. Regulation 
in healthcare takes a variety of different 
forms and is conducted by many different 
actors, from formal regulatory inspections to 
voluntary efforts to promote good practice. 
Regulatory processes and activities poten-
tially provide valuable feedback to provider 
organisations, supporting improvement and 
ensuring that high standards of performance 
are maintained.1 Critics argue that although 
regulation may have valuable effects, it is 
too often ineffective,2 inflexible3 and gener-
ates ticking box behaviour and bureaucratic 
compliance.4 
A number of organisations and commenta-
tors have called for reform, proposing that the 
regulatory system needs to be simpler, organ-
ised around a common approach to regula-
tion and less burdensome for providers.5 6 
However, before such broad proposals can be 
given, proper consideration of a fundamental 
question must be addressed. What is the 
nature and extent of the current system? In 
this study, we aimed to map the current regu-
latory system for patient safety in the NHS, 
including both statutory regulators and other 
organisations with regulatory influence. 
Understanding this landscape of regulation 
of safety is an essential preliminary to any 
rational reform of the regulatory system but 
has, to our knowledge, never been previously 
attempted.
regulation, regulators and patient safety
The term ‘regulation’ can be viewed nega-
tively and narrowly by those who are subject 
to regulatory oversight.7 In healthcare 
settings in particular, regulation can often be 
seen as intrusive and inefficient interference 
strengths and limitations of this study
 ► This is the first study to attempt a complete mapping 
of all organisations engaged in regulatory activities 
in the NHS.
 ► We have included all statutory regulators but also 
many others who may not see themselves as regula-
tors but nevertheless carry out regulatory activities.
 ► Understanding the full regulatory landscape enables 
more precise assessment of the benefits and costs 
of regulation.
 ► Due to resource constraints, we were only able to 
identify regulatory activities from the websites of the 
relevant organisations.
 ► Although we have searched extensively, we cannot 
be sure that this is a complete mapping.
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by external authorities that distracts from the important 
tasks of clinical care.8 However, activities of regulation 
are typically much broader and more constructive than 
this.9 10 Regulation represents a wide range of different 
activities that seek to shape motives and attitudes within 
organisations, as well as policies and protocols.11 In 
healthcare, regulatory activities can encompass every-
thing from formal regulatory inspections, attempts to 
promote good practice, to efforts to support and initiate 
culture improvement.12 13 Moreover, regulatory activities 
are commonly engaged in by a diverse range of different 
actors and institutions across healthcare, from statutory 
regulators to national agencies to professional bodies 
and charitable organisations.
The regulatory landscape of healthcare is therefore 
complex and multifacetted. To begin mapping the 
current regulatory system around patient safety, it is 
necessary to define the scope of our enquiries. In this 
study, we define patient safety regulation as the processes 
engaged in by institutional actors that seek to shape, monitor, 
control or modify activities within healthcare organisations in 
order to reduce the risk of patients being harmed during their care. 
This definition aims to focus attention on the specific 
activities that are engaged in by ‘external’ actors to influ-
ence ‘internal’ processes of patient safety in healthcare 
organisations. It also aims to encompass the breadth of 
diverse institutional actors that engage in these processes 
of regulation, even when some of those actors may not 
define themselves as formal ‘regulators’.
Evolution of regulation in the nHs
Before continuing to the mapping process, it is important 
to provide a brief historical perspective on regulation 
across the NHS. The 1944 National Health Service White 
Paper recognised that regular inspections of hospitals 
would be valuable but the first true external oversight 
body was not established until 1969, following a series of 
healthcare scandals.14 Until the late 1970s, the Depart-
ment of Health fulfilled most of the regulatory functions, 
but between 1979 and 1997, the conservative adminis-
tration created a number of regulatory bodies (such as 
the NHS Litigation Authority, now NHS Resolution). 
However, broad sectors of the NHS remained free of stat-
utory external oversight or regulation throughout this 
period.15
Several high-profile failures of care in the 1990s 
(including the problems at the Bristol Royal Infirmary, 
Royal Liverpool Children’s Hospital) eroded public trust 
in the NHS. The labour government adopted a more 
interventionist approach to regulation, increasing the 
depth, detail and complexity of inspection processes.5 
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) was established in 1999 and the Commission for 
Health Improvement, the ancestor of the Care Quality 
Commission (CQC), was founded in 2001 to oversee and 
inspect the clinical quality of all NHS services. The 2013 
Francis report on the Mid Staffordshire failings of care 
was a defining moment for the whole regulatory regime 
which had failed to detect and respond to early signs 
of organisational failure.16 The governmental response 
generated more structural changes to the system, with an 
increased focus on devolution of central oversight.
The evolution of regulation in the NHS needs to be 
seen in the context of continual widespread reform and 
restructuring of the wider NHS. In 2002, the National 
Health Service Reform and Healthcare Professionals 
Act merged 95 health authorities into 28 strategic health 
authorities (SHAs).17 In 2006, the number of SHAs 
reduced to 10 and later transformed into four clusters 
(North, South, Midlands and East of England) before 
finally been abolished in April 2013.18 During this time, 
health services commissioning was undertaken by 481 
Primary Care Groups, later reduced to 152 Primary 
Care Trusts (PCTs) in 2002, solely responsible for all 
NHS commissioning.17 Finally, under the Health and 
Social Care Act in 2012, PCTs were replaced by statutory, 
commissioning ‘consortia’, the Clinical Commissioning 
Groups (CCGs).19
The 5-year forward review20 brought the planning and 
regulation of primary, secondary and social care together 
with local authority influence under seven models of care 
each covering a core set of related services (for instance, 
urgent and emergency care networks). Local leaders in 
44 geographical areas have been asked to design sustain-
ability and transformation plans (STPs) to demonstrate 
how they intend to transform services in their local 
areas.21 Ten integrated care systems (ICSs) have evolved 
from STPs, responsible for planning and commissioning 
care for their populations.22
the need to map the regulatory landscape of the nHs
This short overview of regulation history in the UK 
demonstrates a stream of structural reforms over the 
last 25+ years, which have gradually increased the extent 
and complexity of the regulatory structures.16 23 In 2002, 
Walshe argued that: ‘Current regulators vary widely in 
their statutory authority, powers, scope of action, and 
approach. The resulting mosaic of regulatory arrange-
ments is highly fragmented and some roles are dupli-
cated’.24 Since then, the complexity of the system has 
increased considerably. A report from the NHS confeder-
ation argued that this complexity places an unnecessary 
burden on healthcare organisations when, for example, 
different regulators request evidence for similar safety 
standards.25 The Professional Standards Authority has 
pointed out that all the nine bodies they oversee have 
a common set of functions yet there are differences in 
legislation, standards, approach and efficiency, among 
others.6
In this study, we attempted to map the complete land-
scape of all organisations with patient safety regulatory 
effect on NHS providers and consider the impact of this 
system on NHS provider organisations. This means iden-
tifying all organisations which exert regulatory influence, 
not just those designated as statutory regulators. In our 
preliminary inquiries, it appeared that no one, not even 
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regulatory organisations, had a complete understanding 
of all the bodies with regulatory impact on the NHS.
MEtHOdOlOgy
defining safety regulation
We intended to examine all institutional actors that 
sought to have some form of regulatory impact on health-
care organisations. This of course includes agencies with 
statutory responsibilities, but many other organisations 
exert regulatory influence through standard setting, anal-
ysis and feedback of data, inspection and other activities. 
To capture this wider landscape, we defined organisations 
with regulatory impact as those who fulfilled all of the 
following four criteria:
 ► Consider the improvement of patient safety a part of 
their organisational responsibilities.
 ► Undertake some form or monitoring or oversight of 
safety-related standards or performance.
 ► Engage in formal attempts to influence the safety 
performance of NHS provider organisations (there are 
various ways this can be achieved in practice).
 ► Derive some form of legitimacy or external authority 
for their work on safety.
Mapping process
We used a variety of sources to gradually build up a 
picture of the patient safety regulatory landscape of the 
NHS. First, we identified publicly available documents 
listing external inspection agencies for five NHS Trusts—
two community, two acute and one mental health. These 
lists summarise regulatory visits, inspections, assessments 
and accreditations made by regulatory bodies. This 
exercise provided an initial list of regulatory agencies. 
The Trusts themselves admitted that they were not sure 
of how many agencies were visiting them or requiring 
information. Advisory consultations with members of 
Trusts’ regulatory compliance teams complemented the 
final list of agencies involved in overseeing healthcare 
providers.
We then scanned the official websites of all statutory 
regulatory agencies. We also searched for existing collab-
orations and partnerships with other institutions which 
increased the number of organisations detected.
The review eventually evaluated over 200 organisations, 
in some way involved in overseeing healthcare together 
with over 200 CCGs. We refined this list to include only 
those organisations meeting the four inclusion criteria set 
out above. We then classified all these organisations under 
three broad categories according to their core aim (1) 
statutory regulators of services, such as CQC, (2) statutory 
regulators of professionals, such as the General Medical 
Council, and (3) organisations with regulatory influence 
and effect (such as Royal Colleges and standard setting 
organisations) (figure 1). In case organisations fell under 
more than one cluster, a decision was reached through 
discussions among members of the research group.
describing regulatory activities of organisations
To gain a more in-depth understanding of the patient 
safety-related activities these organisations carry out, 
we documented how they monitor professional perfor-
mance, the way they evaluate compliance with standards 
and what actions are involved in approaching perceived 
deficiencies (eg, enforcement sanctions, public ratings, 
legal prosecution and so on).
We reviewed a variety of sources; official websites, stat-
utory instruments, reports and other records (eg, infor-
mation enfolded in various electronic domains such as 
annual reviews, strategic plans, meeting minutes and so 
on) and identified a list of external oversight functions. 
We then simplified the list by removing duplicates and 
combining activities which were essentially similar but 
described in different ways by different organisations. 
We additionally consulted a small advisory group of 
healthcare regulation experts, both practitioners and 
researchers, to reach consensus on classifying the activi-
ties into a more concise list. Based on consensus among 
the authors, all regulators and regulatory actors carry out 
15 overseeing functions (figure 2).
Patient and public involvement
A small advisory group with patient representatives 
supported the design of the project. Preliminary findings 
were presented to a larger seminar at the Health Founda-
tion with several patient representatives present.
rEsults
Our mapping revealed that over 126 organisations exert 
some safety regulatory effect on NHS provider organisa-
tions in addition to Health Services Commissioners; 211 
CCGs and 10 ICSs (figure 3). Of the 126 organisations 
we identified, 3 are national overseeing bodies, 18 are 
Figure 1 Overview of healthcare regulation map.
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statutory regulators and 104 are organisations with regu-
latory effect which makes a total of 125. The 126th entity, 
is a grouping of all the national Health Services Commis-
sioners; 211 CCGs and 10 ICSs. We emphasise that many 
of these organisations would not see themselves as regu-
lators and indeed regulation is usually not their primary 
function. They do all nevertheless exert some regulatory 
influence on the NHS. The extent of their influence 
and activity varies widely and only a proportion of these 
organisations may be in contact with any one NHS Trust. 
A full list of organisations identified is presented online 
in supplementary appendix figure 1.
Oversight of the system
Three national bodies that fund, lead and support health-
care in England; Department of Health and Social Care 
(DHSC), NHS England and Public Health England 
(PHE).
The DHSC is a ministerial department responsible 
for overseeing the system and is supported by 28 arm’s 
length bodies.26 NHS England oversees the operation 
of 211 CCGs and directly commissions specialist services 
and primary care including GPs, pharmacists, dental 
practices, military and a number of local health services. 
Its main role is to set the priorities and direction of 
the NHS and to improve health and care outcomes for 
people in England. PHE is an executive agency of the 
DHSC with operational autonomy. PHE works with local 
government, parliament, industry and national bodies to 
support public health services such as immunisation and 
screening programmes.
Health services commissioners
Clinical Commissioning Groups
CCGs are independent, NHS statutory bodies respon-
sible for the planning and commissioning of healthcare 
services within their local area. Each NHS provider organ-
isation will work with only a limited number of CCGs, 
which may vary in their remit and functions.
The majority of health services, including emergency 
care, elective hospital care, maternity services, commu-
nity and mental health services and general practices are 
commissioned by the CCGs.27 Currently, there are 211 
CCGs in England, responsible for 2/3 of the total NHS 
England budget. CCGs operate as a strong influencer for 
improving patient safety at provider level through their 
role in seeking assurance providers are meeting safety 
standards.
Integrated care systems
Ten ICSs are involved in the wider health services commis-
sioning landscape as they bring together NHS providers, 
commissioners and local authorities to work in partner-
ship for improving health and care in their area.22 ICSs 
are led by NHS and local government leaders and are 
based on voluntary collaboration. Their principal func-
tions are aligning commissioning plans; incorporating the 
regulatory functions of NHS England and NHS Improve-
ment (NHSI) and planning and managing performance 
in their areas. Responsibility for service delivery rests with 
the organisations that provide care within ICSs and many 
of these organisations are collaborating to put in place 
integrated care plans.22
stAtutOry rEgulAtOrs
Statutory regulators operate with a mandate to oversee 
organisations, services, professionals and healthcare 
products. They often develop quality standards, offer 
accreditation services and support professionals through 
education and training. The full list of statutory regula-
tors is presented in table 1.
regulators of services
Ten statutory bodies oversee healthcare systems and clin-
ical settings such as hospitals, care homes and general 
practices. Their scope of functions includes providing 
standards and guidelines as well as monitoring healthcare 
providers’ safety performance to establish compliance 
with policies and quality standards. They have statu-
tory powers to impose enforcing measures which span 
from suspension or removal from the registry in case of 
non-compliance to criminal prosecution and penalties.
CQC is the primary healthcare regulator in England. 
It is an independent agency, established in 2009 and 
is responsible for registering, inspecting, monitoring 
and rating services of healthcare providers in England. 
Its central role includes investigating, licencing and 
collecting clinical data and performance metrics that 
could reveal problems within services.
Figure 2 Regulatory activities and definitions.
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NHSI is a non-departmental agency monitoring finan-
cial and operational functions across the health sector. 
NHSI works closely with CQC in holding NHS boards to 
account and providing support to providers under-or at 
risk of being under special measures, by designing strate-
gies to improve their performance.28
Other organisations of this cohort are involved in 
assessing, accrediting and licencing healthcare services. 
For example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA) is the statutory body that regulates 
and inspects all in vitro fertilisation healthcare settings, 
assessing compliance and publishing policy papers.29 The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), is a body respon-
sible for regulating workplace health and safety and 
NHS Resolution (Former NHS Litigation Authority) is 
an organisation that manages complaints and negligence 
claims against the NHS.30 Equally, the Environment 
Agency (EA) is accountable for medical waste regulation31 
and Coroners and Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency are both involved in serious incidents 
investigations making inquiries into healthcare providers 
and enforcing sanctions.32 33 
regulators of professionals
Eight statutory bodies oversee the practice of health-
care professionals. Professional regulators have multiple 
responsibilities in addition to strictly regulatory activi-
ties. They also seek to improve education and training, 
provide support to health professionals throughout their 
professional career, from mentoring during training, to 
emotional support services during investigations. Regula-
tory functions include registering of professionals, revali-
dation, training and imposing sanctions where necessary.
The Professionals Standards Authority (PSA) oversees 
the above eight regulators. PSA is an independent body, 
accountable to the parliament and it sets standards for 
those organisations that maintain voluntary registers and 
accredits those that meet them.34 Although their scope 
of action includes monitoring regulators’ performance, 
conducting audits, reviewing decisions regarding fitness 
to practice and reporting to Parliament, they do not iden-
tify themselves as a regulator. PSA can apply conditions 
and suspend or remove accreditation from healthcare 
professionals but does not have the statutory power to 
investigate complaints about the regulators they oversee.19
Organisations with regulatory influence
We found 104 other organisations that critically seek to 
influence the safety performance of NHS provider organ-
isations. These organisations do not, for the most part, see 
themselves as regulators. However, these organisations 
meet the four criteria set out above, being concerned 
with patient safety, seeking to influence standards and 
deriving some form of external legitimacy. They therefore 
exert regulatory influence on provider organisations.
While they do not see themselves as regulators, these 
organisations nevertheless carry out some regulatory 
activities (table 2) and have a significant impact on 
healthcare provider organisations. The group comprises 
national agencies (eg, NICE), professional bodies (eg, 
Royal College of Physicians), patient organisations and 
charities exerting regulatory effects through norm-set-
ting, monitoring and support (eg, Healthwatch England, 
Action Against Medical Accidents). Table 2 summarises 
the institutions with regulatory effect.
The majority of these organisations set standards of 
some kind with which they seek to influence provider 
organisations. Most collect data from provider organisa-
tions and a considerable number carry out investigations 
of some kind when circumstances require. A few can use 
sanctions such as the withdrawal of accreditation. Table 2 
provides a summary of the various regulatory activities of 
each category of the influencing organisations.
Functions and activities of the wider regulatory landscape
Figure 4 shows the different patterns of regulatory activity 
for all the organisations which can influence providers’ 
behaviour. The multitude of organisations that are simul-
taneously involved in various types of activities overseeing 
healthcare is striking. 
All eight professional regulators offer accreditation 
services, register healthcare professionals, provide stan-
dards of care, collect performance data, conduct research 
and carry out investigations in case of complaints against 
Table 1 Statutory regulators of the NHS
Services regulators: 10 Professionals regulators: 8
Care Quality Commission General Medical Council
NHS Improvement General Dental Council
United Kingdom Accreditation Service General Chiropractic Council
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority General Optical Council
Health and Safety Executive General Osteopathic Council
Environment Agency General Pharmaceutical Council
NHS Litigation Resolution Health and Care Professions Council
The Coroners' Society of England and Wales Nursing and Midwifery Council
Human Tissue Authority
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency
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a practitioner. These organisations perform broadly 
similar functions, as one might expect, although this does 
not mean that they carry out activities in the same way or 
have the same underlying model of regulation.
The activities of the regulators of services are much more 
varied. There is no reason to think that all these organisa-
tions should do exactly the same thing, but the variability in 
approach and overlapping functions suggest that there is 
no overall integrated regulatory approach. Inspections for 
assessing the quality of care, for instance, are undertaken by 
a variety of agencies, non-governmental, governmental and 
regional that use different methods. The inspection process 
can take different forms, both in terms of measurements, 
review focus and data used.
Overlapping functions and activities
There are a multitude of overlapping functions and activ-
ities and we can only provide a small number of examples 
here. We identified several local or national organisations 
from the wider landscape responsible for inspection visits, 
accreditation assessments, with a remit to impose sanctions 
that specifically relate to patient safety. These covered safety 
inspections of specific clinical services or against national 
standards (eg, inspections by CQC and NHS Resolution), 
health and safety issues like fire standards, quality of training 
of junior doctors, granting licences and accreditation for 
sterile services, local postmortem and blood transfusion 
services, audits of internal governance structures and so on. 
Some of the organisations listed, carry out separate inspec-
tions of different services. For example, the Royal College 
of Psychiatrists carry out inspections against standards for 
mental health in-patients, high-security mental health units 
and electroconvulsive treatment units. Similarly, in the 
acute care setting, Clinical Pathology Accreditation UK may 
conduct separate visits for histopathology and cytology and 
haematology services.
Investigation of serious incidents and complaints is the 
regulatory function performed by the majority of over-
seeing agencies. Agencies from both the regulators group 
and the wider landscape are involved in investigating 
activities either by conducting these themselves, or by 
overseeing the quality of serious incident investigations 
and ensuring action plans are completed.
Although a multitude of overseeing agencies conduct 
or oversee investigations, not all of them exert the power 
to impose sanctions. Specifically, only CQC, NHSI, HFEA, 
HSE and EA have the authority to impose sanctions and 
enforcement measures to health provider organisations.
dIsCussIOn
In this research project, we have documented the regu-
latory bodies engaged in influencing organisational 
Table 2 Organisations with regulatory influence
Categories
No of 
organisations
Information and standards 11 Operate with a mandate to develop national standards and recommendations 
through evidence-based research, in collaboration with healthcare experts’ teams.
Professional peer review 
and quality improvement
13 Health professional networks, aiming to promote collaboration between healthcare 
organisations.
National advisory groups 21 Engaged in improving quality of care delivered to patients by providing a range of 
strategic professional advice and expertise.
Royal Colleges 19 Membership organisations and professional bodies that promote quality standards 
and support professionals through education and training.
Professional associations 40 Professional associations are commonly multidisciplinary societies with voluntary 
registration status that promote the interests of the group they represent.
Total: 104
Figure 4 Regulatory functions and activities. CCGs, Clinical 
Commissioning Groups; CQC, Care Quality Commission; EA, 
Environment Agency; GCC, General Chiropractic Council; 
GDC, General Dental Council; GMC, General Medical 
Council; GOC, General Optical Council; GOsC, General 
Osteopathic Council; GPhC, General Pharmaceutical Council; 
HCPC, Health and Care Professions Council; HFEA, Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority; HSE, Health and 
Safety Executive; HTA, Human Tissue Authority; MHRA, 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency; 
NHSI, NHS Improvement; NMC, Nursing and Midwifery 
Council; UKAS, United Kingdom Accreditation Service. 
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performance. We divided the landscape into two broad 
categories; the main regulatory bodies with direct, statu-
tory responsibilities, such as the Care Quality Commission 
or the Nursing and Midwifery Council, and other organ-
isations that carry out some regulatory activities but have 
a more indirect influence, such as the Royal Colleges. 
We found that in total, more than 126 organisations are 
engaged in safety related regulatory activities in the NHS. 
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to carry out a 
full mapping exercise of healthcare regulatory actors in 
England.
The existence of multiple regulatory actors,13 the 
complexity and rapid changes of the regulatory envi-
ronment35 and influences on healthcare practice36 and 
service delivery37 have been widely documented in various 
health systems, for example, England, Australia and New 
Zealand.38 Healthcare providers often find themselves 
accountable to a variety of uncoordinated large scale data 
enquiries.39–41 Such enquiries often create duplication of 
work and can undermine the relationship of regulators 
and those on the receiving end.
NHS provider organisations in healthcare are often 
faced with a wide range of disparate organisations and 
agencies all of whom play some role in the creation, moni-
toring and enforcement of safety standards; governmental 
agencies, organisations regulating professionals, manu-
facturers and suppliers of drugs and equipment, chari-
ties, patient advocacy groups, accreditors, professional 
associations, information technology groups and various 
others.42 These nested networks typically find it difficult 
to coordinate their interactions43 which can create confu-
sion on the receiving end and sometimes divert resources 
into ineffective improvement efforts.42 44 Evidence of over-
lapping responsibilities, duplication, practical challenges 
in coordinating regulatory compliance and providing 
assurance have been extensively documented.29–32 For 
example, drawing on interviews with 47 NHS organisa-
tions, Walshe24 noted that Trusts were ‘concerned about 
the time required and workload involved in producing 
the portfolio of evidence’.9 The findings of this mapping 
exercise suggest that trusts are potentially dealing with 
large numbers of organisations when assembling this 
evidence and responding to requests.
New institutional actors, such as the Healthcare Safety 
Investigation Branch (HSIB), are emerging. HSIB is 
purposefully positioned outside the existing regulatory 
structures that surround patient safety in the English 
NHS, and actively seeks to investigate and examine the 
sources of serious risks to patient safety that emerge 
across the healthcare system, and make recommenda-
tions to a range of actors regarding how the healthcare 
system might be improved. An intentional focus is on 
investigating and improving regulators and the regula-
tory system itself.45 It remains to be seen how these activ-
ities will unfold and whether independent, system-wide 
investigators are able to influence change and improve-
ment to individual regulators and the regulators land-
scape as a whole.
Our research suggests that studies that have exam-
ined the benefits and burdens of regulation may have 
considerably underestimated the overall impact on NHS 
Trusts. Future empirical studies evaluating the benefits 
and burdens of regulation might need to look beyond 
the impact of statutory regulators and consider the effect 
of the wider regulatory landscape set out here. This 
mapping will also enable more targeted studies of the 
regulatory process in which the specific activities of the 
multiple organisations engaged can be examined. Argu-
ably, the true costs, benefits and burden of regulation 
in the NHS have never been properly assessed. Future 
research should carry out a full assessment and costings 
of the time spent by trusts in responding to regulatory 
requests of all kinds and from all relevant organisations, 
including both statutory regulators and those with regula-
tory influence. The costing should obviously include both 
resources used by regulatory organisations and those they 
regulate. Only after such an exercise will we be able to 
see what proportion of the NHS budget is truly devoted 
to regulation.
COnClusIOn
In this project, we have mapped out the regulatory land-
scape for patient safety in the NHS. Although we identi-
fied a wide array of organisations with regulatory influence 
through an exhaustive review process, we cannot be sure 
that we identified all organisations exerting any regula-
tory effect. The regulatory system of the NHS has evolved 
rather than been designed and is not fully understood 
even by professional regulators and it is almost impossible 
for the general public to navigate the system. Regulation 
is important and the actions of thoughtful and well-in-
tentioned regulatory organisations have the potential to 
improve health service standards. However, the overall 
impact of the regulatory system hinders the effectiveness 
of regulatory actors and can be challenging for NHS 
providers detracting from safety and quality improvement 
initiatives. A full analysis of the time and resource devoted 
to safety regulations, and an assessment of the costs and 
benefits, would be a major undertaking but could poten-
tially lead to a major simplification of the current system, 
which in turn could produce much more effective and 
responsive regulation.
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